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The utilization of the Village Fund budget has resulted in many improvements
in facilities and infrastructure for rural areas. Still, we cannot deny there is a
misuse of the funding in some village governments. In this study, we aimed to
understand how fraud occurs in village government institutions because there is
a patron-client relationship in a bureaucratic environment. This research is an
ethnographic study using data collection methods in the form of field
observations, documenting files that have relevance for research, and in-depth
interviews with informants by applying the snowball technique to obtain
informants. The field findings show that the social relations between the
political sponsor (patron) and the head of the village government (the client)
make the internal control system that regulates financial procedures not run
properly. In the end, it opens opportunities for the patrons to misuse the village
budget. Fraud behavior is not limited to causing economic losses but also has
implications for damaging the social joints of village community life. This
research offers a village government monitoring model expected to help district
governments develop a monitoring system.
Keywords: fraud, internal control, village government finance, patron-client
relations, ethnographic studies

Introduction
The Republic of Indonesia Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages, mandates the
central government to allocate several state budgets to village government institutions. From
2015 until now, the central government continues to transfer Village Funds to village
governments throughout Indonesia. But ironically, the village apparatus in some village
governments misused the village funds. Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) in the 2018
Village Fund Outlook (https://www.antikorupsi.org/id) noted that corruption cases involving
village governments in Indonesia have increased. In 2015, financial abuse cases engaged as
many as seventeen village governments. In 2017, it increased by ninety-six from the total
village government institutions, recorded at eighty-three thousand three hundred and forty-four
in the same year (www.bps.go.id). The head of the village government involved in corruption
cases in 2015 was fifteen people, and in 2017 there was an increase of sixty-five people. Village
government heads involved in corruption cases experienced a four-fold increase throughout
2015 – 2017. During this vulnerable time, they have accumulated state losses of
Rp.47.560.000.000, -. The increasing instances of village government corruption do not heed
the call from the central government not to misuse the village budget (https://www.tempo.co).
Instructions from the central government have not made cases of misuse of the Village Fund
budget immediately decrease.
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In 2019, the number of villages recorded in the Central Statistics Agency was 83,820,
spread throughout Indonesia (www.bps.go.id). This amount is not proportional to the number
of functional auditors who supervise. Several local governments in Indonesia are experiencing
a shortage of functional auditors. Pasuruan Regency Inspectorate Office
(www.pasuruankab.go.id),
East
Kalimantan
Provincial
Inspectorate
Office
(www.inspektorat.kaltimprov.go.id) and Kuansing Regency Inspectorate Office
(www.riauonline.co.id) are several governments areas with a shortage of auditors. This
deficiency does not include the shortage of functional examiners in other local governments.
Auditors are limited in number, causing the supervisory task not to be carried out optimally for
the village government. The distance between village areas and districts that are far apart is
one of the obstacles to the supervision of the village government.
Bureaucratic violations of the budget also occur in public organizations. Abuse of
authority can arise from the management level (Marzuki et al., 2020), causing bureaucratic
breaches in the form of corruption (Bali, 2018; Lopez-valcarcel et al., 2017) and bribery
(Hanousek & Kochanova, 2016; Soans & Abe, 2015) in public organizations. One of the
violations of public budgets occurs in public goods procurement activities that have
implemented an electronic system (Maulidi, 2017; Zahra et al., 2021)
Alatas (1987) reveals that humans always build social relationships (social relations),
but these relationships often lead to nepotism and collusion in public organizations. As a result,
the internal control procedures of public organizations do not run as they should. Failure of the
internal control system can pave the way for fraud perpetrators (Bali, 2018; Huefner, 2011).
So far, research in forensic accounting has not seen many aspects of social relations as one
factor that can potentially cause fraud behavior.
Building a complete understanding of corruption requires communication between
scientific fields (Jancsics & Jancsics, 2014). Scott (1972) introduced the concept of the patronclient relationship, which examines society's social relations, which is the subject of discussion
in the social sciences and humanities. So far, research in the forensic accounting field has not
paid much attention to aspects of social relations in conducting fraud investigations. Current
research uses aspects of patron-client social relations to fill this gap in the forensic accounting
field.
In Indonesia, patron-client relationships are part of the social interactions of rural
communities (Putra, 2007). Patron-client relationships also develop in the social interactions
of local government bureaucracies (Kausar, 2009). A similar relationship also grows in the
village government bureaucracy. The election of the head of the village government has opened
a democratization space in the village area. However, the selection of the leadership
democratically, there is still a patron-client political practice of several candidates. After an
election, candidates who win the electorate often include their networks into the village
government bureaucracy and form a patron-client network (Andhika, 2018). The establishment
of patron-client relationships in the village government bureaucracy is an affiliation of the
interests of several parties associated with local political alliances.
The patron-client relationship mutated into the bureaucratic system harmed governance
(Sarker, 2008). The public budget is in the co-optation of associated parties in patron-client
ties. Certain parties affiliated in patron-client relationships use public budgets to fulfill the
interests of specific individuals or groups. The shared development budget becomes a
compensation medium in the reciprocal relationship between patron and client (Golden, 2000).
Exclusivity for certain parties provides an opportunity for violations of internal control
procedures to lead to fraudulent actions against the budget within the village government. This
situation makes the public budget enjoyed by specific individuals or groups (Hanif, 2009).
Based on this description, the researcher asks how the pattern of budget abuse arises
through the patron-client relationships that develop in the village government bureaucracy.
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Research Purposes
To understand the causes of fraud by observing patronage relationships in the village
government bureaucracy through qualitative research.
The Context of the Researchers
Entering early 2013, researchers began to give academic attention to the field of village
financial management studies. Researchers' attention to village financial management
increased when the Indonesian government passed Law number 06 of 2014 concerning villages
which contained one of them about the village fund budget. This regulation provides an
opportunity for the village government to allocate the village funds budget from the central
government every year. The village government must manage the village fund budget
following regulations as part of the state finances. Meanwhile, many village apparatuses do not
have technical competence in the governance of the village budget at that time. To overcome
these obstacles, researchers assist village apparatus, especially those who carry out village
financial governance functions in some village governments. Since then, researchers have often
interacted with the village apparatus and, at the same time, observed and follow many events
that occur in the village government bureaucracy, including on research sites. Since being on
the research site, researchers have made observations from outside the bureaucracy and direct
observations from within the bureaucracy and found that good government governance
practices have not been running as expected. This indication the author found, especially in the
village's financial governance practices, is not following regulations, causing material losses
for the local village government.
Methodology
Why Choose Ethnography?
Ethnographic approaches can help researchers examine and understand social and
cultural practices within social groups of either part or all of those communities (Green &
Bloome, 2004). Investigative research using qualitative approach can provide a more
contextual understanding of the meaning of fraud. Previous research in forensic accounting
used qualitative tracing methods (Suleiman & Othman, 2021). Interpretive qualitative methods
are also present in crime studies (Miner-Romanoff, 2012). In the rural context, so far, the
supervision of village government administration has only taken pictures of the quantitative
aspects, but the qualitative aspects have not received serious attention. Qualitative aspects such
as social relations in the bureaucracy often hurt village governance. Qualitative elements such
as social relations in the bureaucracy often hurt village governance. Ethnographic studies,
which are part of the interpretive family, help gain knowledge of socio-cultural realities in a
bureaucratic environment. Research methodology is determined based on how a researcher
perceives a social phenomenon (Wahyuni, 2012). To gain an in-depth understanding of how
people behave and interact socially in the bureaucratic environment of the village government,
researchers used ethnographic methods. Patron-client social relations that develop in the village
government bureaucracy motivate researchers to use ethnographic methods in this research.
Ethnographic studies allow researchers to observe, uncover, and understand the
meaning naturally of social systems (Giazitzoglu & Payne, 2018). Therefore, the steps taken
by researchers are to involve themselves in social group activities but not as full members. This
method is known as participating observers (Bryman, 2012). This technique can provide an
opportunity for the ethnographer to capture and feel for himself the context of the ongoing
cultural event. Nevertheless, researchers experienced minor obstacles to participating
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observers because the study occurred during the Covid-19 debate. Due to Covid-19 reasons,
one of the residents refused when the researcher wanted to stay at his house. However, two
weeks later, one of the residents agreed to accept the researcher to stay temporarily at his home
by maintaining health protocols.
The ethnographic data analysis of the Spradley (2007) model has three stages (see
Figure 1), namely, making a domain analysis, taxonomic analysis (subdomain), and
componential analysis. Qualitative data analysis of the Spradley model can help researchers
find semantic relationships between cultural themes found explicitly on the research site. The
ethnographic data analysis took place concurrently with the researcher doing the field work.
Researchers identify and define cultural themes according to qualitative searches while at the
research site. Domain themes turn into sub-domain details (taxonomies) to gain more specific
and contextual knowledge. The final stage of the ethnographic data analysis is a componential
analysis which deals with Reflection on fraud behavior. In the process of data analysis, a
researcher should have sensitivity in distinguishing views according to his knowledge with the
ability to hear and interpret behavior and reflect on others (Fusch et al., 2018).
Research Stages
Figure 1
Ethnographic Research Steps

Informant selection techniques with “snowball” methods can help researchers improve
access to hidden individuals and groups in qualitative research (Johnson, 2005; Woodley &
Lockard, 2016). Informants include elements of the village government, the Village
Consultative Body, both current and former members, and aspects of the village community
(community leaders and village residents who rent land owned by the village government). The
research sample rolled like a snowball so that the number of informants continued to grow
because it came from the direction of previous informants. In addition to following orders of
earlier informants, the researcher took the initiative to meet certain informants based on
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developing information from the interviews. Figure 2 indicates the flow of informant
circulation.
Figure 2
Snowball Sample Flow Chart

Note. Processed by researchers

Involving researchers in bureaucratic activities that should be part of the village
apparatus does not run smoothly. Researchers hope that involving themselves in bureaucratic
activities can help obtain a contextual picture and in-depth information. However, the reality
is not so; elements of the village apparatus show a closed attitude and limit the activities of
researchers in financial administration activities when the participating observers take place.
This situation made the researcher decide to leave the bureaucratic environment and start
building communication with the Village Consultative Body elements and several other parties
outside the village bureaucracy. Since then, the flow of information has continued to flow
through interviews with several informants. Increasing the scope of informants in qualitative
investigations, especially when conducting fraud investigations, is a good step for researchers
to obtain more in-depth information. Researchers can expand the range of informants if they
have difficulty securing informant information from internal bureaucracy when searching
qualitatively for fraud.
Researchers can do qualitative data testing through confirmation between informants
and documentation (Patton, 2014). Through the triangulation process, the compilation of
research data has an element of validity. The dotted line in Figure 1, leading from one informant
to another, is the data validity line (triangulation). Data that has been confirmed and has content
consistency means that the data contains an element of validity. Positive confirmation of the
information from essential informant information (informant 17) with non-village informant
means the data has a part of validity. However, the interview script from the village secretary
(informant 3) with the information provided by the tenant of the land owned by the village
government (informant 13) contained inconsistencies that showed contrasts. Table 1 included
several interview scripts and triangulation of informant data.

Khairul Shaleh, Gugus Irianto, Ali Djamhuri, and Noval Adib

1211

Table 1
Triangulation of Interview Results

No

a.

b.

Interview Script from nonapparatus informants
The
1 weakness in this village is
that the human resources of the
residents are still far behind. The
educational backwardness of the
villagers makes the rulers in the
village government act
authoritarian. (Informant 16)

Triagulation
Consistent

The human resources of the
villagers are meager. We can
count on the fingers the number of
children who graduate from high
school and college; the number is
much less. (Informant 16)
He
1 is not the head of the village
Consistent
government but has more power
than the village head. (Informant
1)
Residents already know that the
village government head's
political sponsor (patron) is more
in control of the village
government, even though he is not
part of the village
bureaucrat. (Informant 14)

Village Government Official
Interview Script
...one of them, the low
education of the villagers,
often makes local authorities
act arbitrarily. (Informant 17)
For 12 years, the political
sponsors of the village chief
acted as an authoritarian ally
in the village government
bureaucracy. The party
sometimes performs repressive
actions if there is a
complaining party (Informant
17).
The village government head's
political sponsor (patron)
pressured the village apparatus
to follow his wishes despite
violating the applicable
regulations. (Informant 17)

Political sponsors (patrons) of the
village government head have
been controlling clove and coffee
plantations, including controlling
the village government
bureaucracy (Informant 9)

c.

d.

He
1 (the patron) is not an element
of the apparatus in the village
government but always interferes
when the Village Consultative
Body proposes
activities. (Informant 14)

Consistent

Villagers
1
already know that the
political sponsor (patron) of the
head of the village government is

Consistent

The political sponsor (patron)
unilaterally canceled the
development program
resulting from village
deliberations, and the village
government leadership
approved the action.
(informant 17)
He (patron) is the contractor
for every village infrastructure
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more powerful to determine the
policy of the village government,
including development policies
whose contractors are the political
sponsors themselves. Informant
14
We
1 have rented land owned by
the village government for 250
“tumbak” since 30 years ago.
Rent value per "tumbak" Rp.
2,000 every year. (1 “tumbak” =
14 square meters). (Informant
13)

development activity.
(informant 17)

Inconsistent

So far, the village government
does not have the potential for
original village
income”. Informant 3

Data Analysis
Domain and Taxonomy Analysis
This stage analyzes the cultural theme and breaks it down into cultural sub-themes
according to participatory observations and interviews while the researchers are in the field.
The cultural theme is related to patronage relations within the village government bureaucracy.
The influence of patronage begins with local political activities and then transforms into the
bureaucratic environment of the village government. The patron-client relationship in the
bureaucracy has terrible implications for public budgets at the village level. Figure 3 illustrates
the flow of the domain and taxonomy analysis process.
Figure 3
The Way Towards the Destination of the Tendency of Fraud

Processed by researchers

Spradley suggests using semantic relationships when determining domains in
ethnographic analysis (Mungin, 2015). One of the nine semantic relationships, namely the
function element, is defined by the researcher as an instrument (Figure 4). The analysis in
Figure 4 explains the mechanisms used by political sponsors (patrons) in dominating the village
bureaucracy. This influence puts the village government bureaucracy under the patron's
control.
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Figure 4
Instruments that are Used to Abuse the Budget and Assets

Note. Processed by researchers

Results
Reflection on Fraud Behavior
Village Social and Economic Overview
The distance between the village area and the city area is far apart, making it difficult
for the district government to monitor the implementation of the village government. The
situation led to the supervision of the performance of the village government being less optimal.
The electronic document-based surveillance system is considered an active solution to
overcome these geographical constraints. However, remote monitoring through electronic
media can only capture material aspects but has not touched the social dimensions hidden in
the bureaucracy. Social elements and negative values in individuals can encourage the onset of
abuse (Alatas, 1987; Irianto et al., 2017; Schwartz, 1994; Yuwanto, 2015), but electronic
surveillance systems have not detected such indications.
Researchers began the ethnographic research process with field observations in a
village area not so far from the center of the provincial capital. Still, they had limited village
infrastructure compared to surrounding villages. Most residents spend time on agricultural land
to meet the needs of family life. Some farmland residents rent from the village government as
landowners. In addition to the farming sector, residents develop coffee plantations on land
owned by the central government to agree on a profit-sharing system. Limiting social activities
due to the pandemic has made nomads in urban areas lose their jobs (Sulistyorini, 2020). Losing
their jobs forced people to return to their villages and start farming activities.
Education is a family burden for villagers on research sites with limited economic
conditions. Economic resources are more remarkable for the fulfillment of short-term
consumption than the future investment of the family through education. The reality of people
with these conditions occurs in rural areas far from the reach of educational facilities (Basrowi
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& Juariyah, 2010). Observation of researchers on the research site, the limitations of education
cause economic limitations of rural communities. Local rulers often take advantage of the
financial limitations of villagers for the political interests of the village level.
Village Bureaucracy in the Shadows of Patrons
The head of the village government institution is the head of the village government,
but the political sponsor controls the bureaucracy. Political sponsors are influential figures in
the village environment or informal figures (Jefta, 1995). Relaxed figures dominate
bureaucratic affairs, thus creating patronage within the village government. The approval of
the patron must precede bureaucratic activities. In de jure, the highest power of the village
bureaucracy lies with the head of the village government, but de facto authority rests with the
patron. The patron's decision always precedes the formal collective judgment that the village
government should arrange bureaucratically. The domination of patrons in the village
bureaucracy is so strong that violations of village procedural regulations often arise. Figure 5
is a chart of the organizational structure of the village government which we provide additional
information to show the position of patron-client relations in the bureaucracy.
Figure 5
The Patron-Client Relationship in the “X” Village Government Structure

Village Budget Politics: Discrimination between Villages
Observations on the research site, the local village government compiled a development
program according to the planning regulations. Still, unilaterally the patron canceled and
rearranged the development plan according to his political interests. The patrons relocated the
development program to the electoral base area. On the other hand, locations whose citizens
do not provide electoral support will not allocate village development programs. The
realization of the village development program is more oriented towards fulfilling the political
interests of patrons rather than prioritizing the villagers' aspirations. The patrons and heads of
village government elaborate the authority of village government institutions to achieve their
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economic and political interests. Figure 6 shows patron dominance in village infrastructure
development programs.
Figure 6
Sociogram of Patron Domination in Village Infrastructure Program

Note. Processed by researchers

Village Budget Fraud Pattern
Village government bureaucrats under patron control cause village financial
governance regulations to run improperly. Violations of village financial governance
regulations often occur due to pressure from patrons. The village infrastructure development
budget should be under the control of the village government head, but instead, the patron
controls the budget as a builder of buildings. Patron's control of the village infrastructure
development budget opens opportunities for budget abuse.
Another aspect of this village is that some of the villagers worked on farmland owned
by the village government. Land owned by the village government is known as the local land
carik. Local farmers grow various types of vegetables and secondary crops on carik soil. The
farmers rented the land from the village government. The Minister of Home Affairs Regulation
Number 1 of 2016 concerning Village Asset Management states, "Lease is the use of assets
belonging to the village government that other parties use for a certain period, and the village
government receives cash rewards." According to the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation
Number 20 of 2018 concerning Village Financial Management, cash rewards from asset rental,
Article 12 Letter b is a "Village original income group." However, the excerpts from interviews
with village secretaries differ from farmers who rent land belonging to the village government
(Table 1, Number 1e.). The village government should recognize the receipt of land lease
proceeds as the original income of the village, but the fact is not like that.
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Figure 7
Village Government Budget Fraud Patterns on the Research Site

Note. Processed by researchers

Discussion
Fraud is an expression of someone's behavior shown in the form of cheating. Fraud
triangle theory explains that someone commits an act of fraud because of the encouragement
of three main elements, namely pressure, opportunity, and rationalization (Cressey, 1964).
Several previous studies add to the elements that make up the Fraud Triangle Theory (Imoniana
et al., 2016; Maulidi, 2020; Schuchter & Levi, 2016). This research finds that social relations
in organizations can pave the way for budget fraud if the relationship leads to exclusivity. In
this context, the social relation factor is a finding that can fill the elements in the fraud triangle
theory.
Fraud Triangle Theory as a perspective can analyze the background of a person or group
driven to commit acts of fraud. Observations and interviews with informants on research sites
show that social relationships in the form of patron-client can lead to budget fraud in the village
government bureaucracy.
The patronage value deliberately created by the patron in the village bureaucracy is
understood to present dominance in the village government bureaucracy. Therefore, given the
fraud triangle theory, the patron-client relationship between the political sponsor and the village
government head meets the criteria of the element of opportunity. This situation makes the
patrons dominate in the bureaucratic environment, which opens opportunities for fraudulent
behavior in the village budget.
The desire imposed by the patron led the village apparatus to follow the will of the
patron even though they were aware of violating the provisions of the regulation. Thus, the
patron's attitude, who often imposes his will in the view of the fraud triangle theory, is a
pressure experienced by the ranks of the village apparatus. The desire imposed by the patron
led the village apparatus to follow the will of the patron even though they were aware of
violating the provisions of the regulation. Thus, the patron's attitude, who often imposes his
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will in the view of the fraud triangle theory, is a pressure experienced by the ranks of the village
apparatus.
Recommended Monitoring Model
The conceptualization of the supervision model for the village government was
prepared based on the bureaucratic conditions encountered during field research. The village
consultative agency as a representative of the village community has not been able to carry out
the supervisory function of the village government as it should. Knowledge of the role as a
member of the village consultative body is not well known. As a result, monitoring, budget,
and regulatory functions have not been running, which led to fraud in the village government.
The village government runs without adequate supervision so that there are many bureaucratic
violations. Therefore, universities and village governments need to increase the Village
Consultative Agency members' capacity. Higher education institutions play a role in increasing
the power of human resources for members of the Village Consultative Body.
University actors transfer knowledge to members of the village consultative body to
improve the supervision performance of the village government bureaucracy. They function as
the village consultative body members and become a primary responsibility, not just filling in
leisure activities.
Village escort personnel can monitor the implementation of fencing and establish
partners with sub-district level supervisory teams. Thus, the supervision of the village
government runs by internal and external parties. Sub-district supervisors play leadership from
external parties, and village consultative bodies play internal management. Primordial elements
in rural communities that often give rise to bureaucratic bias can be controlled by involving
supervisors from external bureaucracies. This model can be a consideration for the government
to minimize fraud and bring the village government accountable.
Figure 8
Village Government Supervision Model

Note. Processed by researchers

Conclusion
Some literature explains that applying internal control systems can suppress potential
fraud in organizations (Albrecth et al., 2012; Huefner, 2011; Karyono, 2013; Sawyer, 2006).
However, the findings in this context show that the existence of patron-client relations in the
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bureaucracy has succeeded in overriding the provisions of financial procedures, which means
there is a failure to implement the internal control system in the village government. The social
relations between the patron and the village head make monitoring and guaranteeing the
implementation of the internal control system not functioning correctly. This situation made
the internal control system excluded from bureaucratic operations and, in the end, opened the
way for patrons to commit budget fraud within the village government.
Since 2015 - 2019, the allocation of Village Funds has increased from year to year.
However, in 2020, the allocation value stagnated due to the recession due to COVID-19. In
2021, through the Republic of Indonesia's finance ministry, the government will allocate a
Village Fund of 72 trillion-rupiah (www.kontan.co.id). The government hopes that the Village
Fund budget supports economic recovery but will face risks if the monitoring system is not
improved. The model (Figure 6) of optimizing supervision of the Village Government can be
an academic offer that the government can use to regulate the village government's supervisory
system.
Finally, this research resulted from a very contextual field study. Developing this
research can be used using a mixed methodology for subsequent researchers. In addition, this
research can also be grown in other village areas with different social, cultural, political, and
economic backgrounds. Research in other villages can increase the internality element of this
research.
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